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Stakeholder interaction and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) practices: evidence 
from the Zambian copper mining sector 
 
Abstract 
 
Purpose – This paper critically explores the interactions of key stakeholders and their impact 
upon Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) practices in the Zambian copper mining sector. 
In particular, we examine the power dynamics that emerge in the stakeholder interactions  
Design/methodology/approach – We analyse the stakeholder interactions based on the 
varying degrees of stakeholder salience and critical collaboration potential, and draw on rich 
evidence from forty-three interviews with multiple stakeholders involved in CSR in the 
Zambia mining sector.  
Findings – This paper finds stark power asymmetries in the relationship between the state 
and mining companies which are exacerbated by a number of factors, including divisions 
within the government itself as a key stakeholder and divergent CSR perceptions. However, 
despite these power asymmetries some limited agency is possible, as civil society in 
particular co-opts previously dormant stakeholders to increase its own salience and, more 
importantly, that of the state. 
Originality/value - This paper contributes to the literature on the key actors’ interactions 
shaping CSR in developing countries by exploring these issues in a critical industry, the 
Zambian copper mining sector, on which the state economy is so heavily dependent. 
Key words - Corporate social responsibility; mining sector; civil society; the state; 
developing countries; Zambia. 
Paper type – Research paper. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper explores the complex interactions between key stakeholders which shape 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) [1] practices in the context of a developing country. 
Whilst a limited number of recent studies focus on CSR-related issues in developing 
countries generally (Belal et al., 2015; Belal and Owen, 2007; Lauwo et al., 2016), there is an 
increasing interest in CSR in Africa (e.g. Rahaman, 2010). However, while much existing 
CSR research pays more attention on the outcomes of CSR, such as CSR disclosures and 
practices in developing countries (Belal and Owen, 2015; Fox, 2004; Idemudia, 2011), our 
focus is on exploring the local processes and dynamic interactions of multiple actors shaping 
these CSR outcomes. 
  
In the context of developing countries, and in the oil, gas and mining sectors in particular, 
there are concerns about the adverse impact of the operations of multinational companies 
(MNCs) on local communities and the environment, thus increasing demands for greater 
corporate social responsibility and accountability (Lund-Thomsen et al., 2016). In this 
context, CSR remains a politically contested area of power relationship imbalances, as 
multinational corporations may intervene in political processes to attain corporate objectives, 
while governments are highly dependent on foreign investment and lack the capacity to 
motivate or enforce fundamental regulations to CSR (Frynas, 2005; Jamali and Karam, 
2016). CSR studies note the problematic ‘business-state nexus’ responsible for perpetuating 
human rights violations by companies in developing countries (Lauwo and Otusanya, 2014; 
Siddiqui and Uddin, 2016). In response to criticisms regarding MNCs’ social and 
environmental actions, processes of stakeholder dialogue have become a key aspect of 
companies’ CSR strategy to enhance their accountability. This has led, for example, to the 
emergence of new and various forms of interactions between Non-Governmental 
Organisations’ (NGOs) and businesses in pursuit of CSR, with NGOs often playing a 
mediating role attempting to alter the power dynamics among companies and other 
stakeholders (Banerjee, 2008). Within the CSR literature, studies have focused on the 
interaction between NGOs and companies in developing countries (e.g., Arenas et al., 2013; 
Baur and Schmitz, 2012; Idemudia, 2017) and point out that these alliances are mostly 
symbolic rather than integrative and substantive endeavours (Jamali and Keshishian, 2009) 
failing to promote CSR due to power inequalities, capacity constraints and lack of 
understanding of the needs of local communities (Lauwo et al., 2016; Newell, 2005). 
However, there is little evidence available as to the multifaceted interactions of multiple 
stakeholders that drive, enhance or restrict CSR outcomes in developing countries. 
 
These issues are explored through what is a critical case study of the Zambian copper mining 
industry, given the country’s almost total dependence on the sector, which in 2014 
contributed up to 70% of foreign exchange income, and over 10% of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) (International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2015). The industry is mainly controlled by 
MNCs, on which the state depends to provide investment following the sector’s privatisation 
(International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM), 2014). Such dependence on the 
mining sector for economic development gives rise to stark power asymmetries in the 
relationship between Zambia, as a developing country, and the foreign-owned mining 
companies. The limited CSR reporting is directed mainly towards ‘public image building’ 
motivated by project financing purposes for those companies with a western parent company 
(Phiri and Mantzari, 2017), while despite CSR initiatives by mining companies, mining 
operations continue to have detrimental socio-economic and environmental impacts on 
Zambia (Christian Aid, 2015; Human Rights Watch, 2011). 
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Our first major contribution, therefore, lies in our focus on CSR in the Zambian mining sector 
with its complex political economy terrain composed of multiple actors, such as political 
elites, underdeveloped civil society and powerful mining companies all seeking to pursue 
their interests through strategic interactions. However, rather than focusing on the interaction 
between individual actors (such as, NGOs-business and state-business interactions) or placing 
the companies at the centre of analysis, the multiple stakeholders are seen as being 
interrelated and as constituting part of a dynamic web of complex local relationships. The 
different stakeholders have competing interests, varying degrees of salience (Mitchell et al., 
1997; Neville and Menguc, 2006; Neville et al., 2011) and collaboration potential with other 
groups (Covey and Brown, 2001; Hamann et al., 2005). With regard to our second 
contribution, , we critically engage with the role of the state as an important stakeholder in 
enhancing CSR, something that has received limited attention in CSR studies in developing 
countries (Idemudia, 2011; Jamali and Karam, 2016). A third major contribution is that we 
refine Mitchell et al.'s (1997) stakeholder salience framework which has been criticised as 
being static and short-term in orientation (Baba and Raufflet, 2017) by situating stakeholder 
interactions within a complex system of irregular, non-linear and path dependent (Hamann et 
al, 2005) actions taking place over time, with consequences for the evolution of stakeholder 
power. As a fourth contribution, is that within these stakeholder groups, we find a lack of 
homogeneity as there are competing voices within each group, so affecting CSR outcomes. 
This lack of homogeneity is particularly marked within the mining companies as a 
stakeholder group which includes Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). Finally, our fifth 
contribution which is highly significant given the stark power asymmetries existing between 
the state and the corporates, lies in the subtlety added to understanding the state-business 
nexus (Siddiqui and Uddin, 2016) and the potential of ‘surrogate accountability’ to hold 
powerful stakeholders into account, so strengthening the position of less powerful 
stakeholders (Belal et al., 2015; Rubenstein, 2007). 
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses the theoretical 
framework adopted, providing the background to understanding the interactions of different 
stakeholders generally in developing countries, and of the mining sector in particular. We 
then describe our research approach, the local context and CSR developments in the mining 
sector in order to contextualise the empirical analysis. We subsequently present and discuss 
our findings, and conclude that, despite stark power asymmetries present in the relationship 
between the state and mining companies, some limited agency is possible, as civil society in 
particular co-opts other stakeholders to increase its own salience and, more importantly, that 
of the state. 
 
2.  CSR processes and stakeholder interactions 
 
2.1. Theoretical framework 
The CSR literature is “voluminous, disparate, eclectic, and still without commonly agreed 
philosophies or standpoints” (Parker, 2005, p. 844). Stakeholder theory (Clarkson, 1995; 
Freeman, 1984) and legitimacy theory (Lindblom, 1994; Suchman, 1995) have dominated 
CSR research through their concern with explaining the interactions between organisations 
and their environments (Gray et al., 1995). These theoretical approaches are clearly important 
in explaining the way organisations are continually seeking to establish congruence between 
their values system and that of key stakeholders and society, in general. CSR disclosures and 
practices, for example, are seen as instruments of external accountability to influence, and 
even manipulate, stakeholder perceptions (e.g., Deegan, 2002; Milne and Patten, 2002). At 
the same time, sceptical voices continue to be raised concerning the inability of these 
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theoretical approaches, by themselves, to capture the complexity of stakeholder interaction 
with regard to CSR practices in developing countries. Legitimacy theory, for example, is 
criticised for its inability to explain why despite the increasing social and environmental 
impact of corporate activities, companies continue to carry out these activities unchallenged 
(Banerjee, 2008). Indeed, Lauwo et al. (2016, p. 1043) argue that the extent to which 
stakeholder and legitimacy theories “can explain the contradictions and dilemmas faced by 
developing countries with respect to CSR practices has remained problematic [as] they pay 
little attention to the broader socio-political, economic, historical and power structures that 
shape CSR reporting practices”. Considering these criticisms, our research aims to explore 
the dynamics of stakeholder interactions, so that we adopt a more nuanced stakeholder 
approach that acknowledges the role of power in stakeholder relationships. We move from a 
stakeholder model which represents stakeholder relationships as one-sided, placing 
companies at the centre of analysis, to one that represents stakeholders as entrenched in a 
more complex web of relationships that extend beyond the business domain. In order to 
capture the complexity of stakeholder interactions, we employ complementary theoretical 
perspectives that place sufficient emphasis, not only on stakeholder relationships which are 
defined by the desire to achieve legitimacy[2], but also on the role of power and power 
asymmetries in the interactions among the various stakeholders (Covey and Brown, 2001; 
Hamann et al., 2005; Mitchell et al., 1997; Neville et al., 2011).  
 
In order to capture the role of power in stakeholder relationships, we build on a broad 
stakeholder salience framework (Mitchell et al., 1997; Neville and Menguc, 2006; Neville et 
al., 2011) so as to explore the reasons why mining companies may pay attention to specific 
social groups but ignore others. From a company perspective, the salience of various 
organisational stakeholders is assessed based on the combination of three stakeholder 
attributes: power, urgency, and legitimacy (see figure 1). 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Drawing on Etzioni (1964), Mitchell et al. (1997) define power in an organisational setting 
based on the type of resource used to exercise power. In particular, “…a party to a 
relationship has power, to the extent it has or can gain access to coercive, utilitarian, or 
normative means, to impose its will in the relationship. […] this access […] is a variable, not 
a steady state, which is one reason why power is transitory: it can be acquired as well as lost” 
(Mitchell et al., 1997, p. 865-866). Whilst each stakeholder group has some possible source 
of power (e.g., the state has regulatory power, mining companies possess economic power 
and CSOs, potentially political or influential power) (Freeman and Reed, 1983), power 
asymmetries depend on the extent to which one stakeholder group’s power base is more 
pronounced than the other. Based on Suchman’s (1995, p. 574) definition, Mitchell et al. 
(1997, p. 866) define the second attribute, legitimacy, as a ‘generalized perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions’. Organisations may use 
legitimation techniques by linking themselves to other institutions, such as political parties, in 
order to develop moral and cognitive legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). Siddiqui and Uddin 
(2016) offer the example of the Bangladeshi state that depends on businesses not only for 
economic reasons, such as investment and employment, but also because of business-owners’ 
influence over state politics. The state and businesses work closely together in a state-
business nexus to legitimise their position in light of human rights violations. Alternatively, 
NGOs’ activism in developing countries can create legitimacy gaps, so providing significant 
motivation for companies to engage in responsible practices with the aim of either acquiring 
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or maintaining legitimacy (Dahan et al., 2010; Lauwo et al., 2016). Urgency, as the third 
attribute of salience means that the claims of are critical to a potential stakeholder and are 
time-sensitive.  
 
Within a stakeholder salience framework, silent or dormant stakeholders, for example, are 
stakeholders who possess power to impose their will on a company but their power remains 
unused due to the lack of a legitimate relationship or an urgent claim (e.g., MNCs 
shareholders or donors in the context of our study). Previously dormant stakeholders may 
have little or no interaction with a firm, but may become more salient to management if they 
acquire either urgency or legitimacy. On the other hand, discretionary stakeholders possess 
legitimacy but have no power to influence and no urgent claims (Mitchell et al., 1997). Other 
studies that have built on the stakeholder salience framework emphasise that the importance 
of urgency and legitimacy as a key stakeholder attributes may vary in particular contexts and 
note that salience may be assessed in terms of stakeholder coalitions around issues and 
organisational fields (Neville and Menguc, 2006). Neville and Menguc (2006) also highlight 
that stakeholder multiplicity means that stakeholders may form strategic alliances to increase 
their persuasive power of their combined claim to act upon organisations. Baba and Raufflet 
(2017) indicate, however, that mainstream stakeholder salience theory is in many ways still 
largely static, short-term oriented and firm-centred and as such, does not address how power 
attributes of stakeholders evolve over time. Indeed, in relation to this criticism, Mitchell et al. 
(1997) do not recognise the possibility of path dependence according to which history matters 
for current decision-making situations. In other words, future courses of action and 
stakeholder interactions may be constrained by previous developments and events (Hamann 
et al., 2005). 
 
The complexity of the stakeholder interaction, therefore, is further heightened by possible 
heterogeneity within the different stakeholder groups and the changing relationship among 
stakeholders over time, so affecting stakeholder power relations and collaboration potential 
(Kochan and Rubinstein, 2000). Hamann et al. (2005), building on complexity theory and the 
work of Covey and Brown (2001), identify various aspects of stakeholder interactions within 
and beyond the immediate ambit of companies that contribute, or undermine the potential of 
collaboration and enhanced CSR at the local level attending to the role of power, legitimacy 
and accountability. The potential of collaboration depends on: (i) the balancing of power 
asymmetries through the access to power-based strategies (e.g., legal recourse); (ii) the 
acknowledgement of critical rights as codified in international agreement and national laws; 
(iii) a development of an understanding of stakeholders’ conflicting and converging interests; 
and (iv) that the leadership of various stakeholder groups is seen as legitimate and 
accountable. In developing countries, much of the CSR literature has focused on business-
civil society interactions (e.g., Arenas et al., 2013; Baur and Schmitz, 2012; Idemudia, 2017) 
and shows that due to the strategic notions of CSR advanced by business actors, NGOs may 
find their impact on business practices lessened. However, a coalition of NGOs in partnership 
with a corporation can reduce the vulnerability of civil society to co-optation by the more 
powerful business stakeholders. Similarly, focusing on the case of civil society, studies have 
pointed out that there is the potential of “critical cooperation” with other stakeholders (Covey 
and Brown, 2001), or formation of strategic alliances with external stakeholders, such as 
donors and shareholders, which have influence over the state (Combes et al., 2016; Heller, 
1975) and corporations (Mitchell et al., 1997) respectively. However, with respect to Zambia 
specifically, Hamann and Kapelus (2004, p. 90) argue that, “in the case of the Copperbelt, the 
danger is that it is too remote for consistent surveillance from independent and critical 
organizations”. Yet, there are increasing calls for “surrogate accountability” (which can 
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include partnerships with governments, supra-national bodies, and other civil society actors), 
as such surrogates may be better equipped to pressurise power wielders to do what is “right” 
(Rubenstein, 2007). 
 
Lastly, as previously indicated, the processes that inform CSR initiatives, and the interaction 
of stakeholders who seek to leverage their interests, are bounded by the local socio-political 
and economic context. The lack of human and institutional capacity to address stakeholders’ 
concerns and promote CSR in developing countries has been highlighted previously in the 
literature (Fox, 2004; Idemudia, 2011). However, the structural determinants and constraints 
which enable or constrain CSR initiatives and developments in African countries are largely 
underdetermined (Idemudia, 2014). In the context of power asymmetries, these manifest 
themselves at the very outset, for example in terms of the negotiation of mineral development 
agreements between the host state and mining companies, thus leading to a governance gap 
(Hilson, 2012), such that the state finds its capacity to enforce corporate accountability 
regulations becoming significantly compromised (Lauwo et al., 2016).  
 
Figure 2 summarises our conceptualisation of the interactions among the major stakeholder 
groups and our theoretical framework which guides the analysis of our empirical evidence. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
In the next section, we discuss the role of the various stakeholders in the extractive industries 
in developing countries, followed by a discussion of the particular context of the Zambian 
mining sector and of the various stakeholders involved in the CSR arena. 
 
2.2. The role of the various stakeholders in CSR in developing countries  
Whilst CSR is generally seen as being influenced by societal expectations (Carroll and 
Buchholz, 2014), the picture that emerges for developing countries is more complex. In this 
context, debates focus on the relationship between CSR and development, and the impact that 
such initiatives have on developing countries’ socio-economic development (Reed and Reed, 
2004). The lack of understanding of the complex relationships between CSR practices, local 
actors, contexts, and development, results in a recurring tension between local communities’ 
CSR expectations and local challenges and opportunities (Hamann, 2006). 
 
The CSR agenda in developing countries is determined mainly by the interaction between 
mining companies, civil society and the state (Fung, 2003; Vogel, 2008). In particular, critical 
voices have raised concerns about the conflict between the power of corporations and that of 
the state (Scherer and Palazzo, 2007; Sikka, 2010), with the latter affording autonomy and so 
political power (Lehman, 1999). As a result, much of the corporates’ decision-making, 
including that related to their social and environmental responsibilities, has remained free 
from any government control or influence (Bailey et al., 1998) due to the significant 
economic benefits they bring to developing countries. Such dependence is often exacerbated 
by fears that these institutions may relocate if enacted regulations are perceived to encroach 
on companies’ decision-making (O’Dwyer et al., 2005). Such a level of autonom , then, 
enables MNCs to prioritise global, as opposed to local, expectations. 
 
Against this background, the role of civil society in promoting CSR practices in developing 
countries has increased, as the majority of governments have failed to provide the 
infrastructure and environment enabling the promotion of CSR (Utting, 2002). Importantly, 
corporate behaviour has been exposed to public scrutiny as a result of civil society activism 
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(Dahan et al., 2010). Another critical role played by civil society lies in its representation of 
the less powerful voices in society (Banerjee, 2001; Blowfield and Frynas, 2005).         
           
The extractive industries and the mining sector in Africa also face great pressures to embrace 
CSR, due to their large-scale adverse effects on the environment and local population. 
Hamann and Kapelus (2004) examined the CSR practices of mining companies in both South 
Africa and Zambia, finding that there are still important gaps between mining companies’ 
CSR activities and accountability. Importantly, they argue that, in Zambia, CSR practices 
have little influence on fundamental business decisions based on profitability, which often 
have the most significant adverse social impact. Instead, CSR activities played a primarily 
“ameliorative role in the context of significant social disruptions and uncertainty in the wake 
of privatisation” (Hamann and Kapelus, 2004, p. 90). Similarly, Lungu and Mulenga (2005), 
in a commissioned report on the CSR practices in the Copperbelt region, found significant 
changes in CSR approaches, with deterioration after the privatisation of the state-owned 
Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM). Whilst these are important studies on the 
Zambian Copperbelt, they are more limited in scope and, importantly, do not focus 
specifically on the interactions between key Zambian stakeholders in determining CSR 
practices, the key research question of this study. 
 
Whilst Zambia’s mining sector constitutes a critical case, we note that prior studies on the 
sector have not addressed stakeholder interactions, power asymmetries, and their impact on 
CSR practices. Instead, they have focused on privatisation and mining development 
agreements (Fraser and Lungu, 2007; Lungu, 2008a), provision of welfare/social services 
(Lungu, 2008b), Chinese investment and corporate governance (Haglund, 2009; Negi, 2008), 
local communities and mining investment (Negi, 2010; Van Alstine and Afionis, 2013), the 
environmental impact of mining on farming land (Kříbek and Nyambe, 2005), and the social 
experiences of former miners (Mususa, 2010). Studies that are directed at CSR in the sector 
are also few and limited in their focus. Noyoo (2010), for example, examined the link 
between CSR and government policies in Zambia, while Lungu and Shikwe (2006) focused 
on small scale (mostly gemstone) mining. Further, a study by Van Alstine and Afionis (2013) 
on a particular local community and mining companies’ CSR practices revealed weak 
community capacity to hold the mining company and local government to account. The 
current study is the first of its kind to focus on key stakeholder interactions and power 
asymmetries with their resultant CSR outcomes in the context of the Zambian copper mining 
industry. 
 
 
3. Research approach 
As in a number of African countries, the development strategy of the mining sector is 
supposed to be based on the proportionate partnership of various stakeholders promoting a 
multi-stakeholder dialogue (Hamann et al., 2005). It is against this background that the 
current study explores the dynamic interactions of key stakeholders and the resultant impact 
on CSR outcomes in the copper mining sector in Zambia. These stakeholders include the 
mining companies, the state and civil society (civil society represents here international/local 
NGOs and trade unions). Other key stakeholders represented include spokespersons from 
other important local and international groups, such as higher education institutions or 
academia (Gray and Guthrie, 2007), national accountancy bodies (Tilt, 2009), the local 
community (Banerjee, 2001), stakeholder engagement initiatives (Andriof and Waddock, 
2002) and one supranational financial institution (Rahaman et al., 2004). 
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We draw upon rich material from 43 semi-structured interviews with individuals representing 
these stakeholder groups (see Appendix 1 for a detailed list of interviewees). Key 
representatives from 39 different institutions who occupied senior management positions or 
else who had considerable leadership roles were targeted and identified using a snow-balling 
technique (Titscher et al., 2000). In order to gain access to some stakeholders, formal 
authorisations or introductions had to be obtained. The data-gathering protocol involved the 
use of face to face interviews, recorded on a digital audio recorder with the permission of the 
respondents. Written notes were also taken during the interviews, which lasted between 45 to 
90 minutes. The 43 interviews were conducted by one of the co-authors during his three-
month fieldwork visit to Zambia between October and December 2011. Questions were based 
on the interview protocol, and stakeholders were encouraged to elaborate freely [3]. In order 
to elicit rich interpretations, interviewees were questioned about CSR in an unprompted 
manner so as to capture their understanding of the CSR processes, their components and their 
significance (Maignan, 2001).  
 
The recorded interviews were subsequently transcribed in their entirety. The transcripts, 
together with any relevant notes taken during the interviews, were read by the three authors, 
who highlighted the key aspects and themes discussed by interviewees based on the 
theoretical framework (Covey and Brown, 2001; Hamann et al., 2005; Kochan and 
Rubinstein, 2000; Mitchell et al., 1997; Neville and Menguc, 2006). Analysis of the 
transcribed data was directed at the search for underlying themes and sub-themes so as to 
address our research objective, whilst remaining sufficiently flexible to profit from 
“opportunistic” dimensions that may arise in the research (Buchanan et al., 1988). In 
particular, a complete coding scheme was developed including key themes such as the 
salience and nature of power asymmetries among the main stakeholders; the various channels 
through which stakeholders interact; possibilities for the exercise of surrogate accountability; 
and instances of effective and/or ineffective interactions of stakeholders. Excerpts from the 
transcripts were categorised under the different analytical themes, and the process was 
repeated until the most important and relevant quotes were identified. The quotations used 
present the “thick description” (Denzin, 1994, p. 505), as they appear to represent a particular 
theme. Each interview was numbered and the quotations in the analysis below are in the 
format of “interview number, page from relevant text”. In attempting a fine-grained analysis 
of the multifaceted nature and dimensions of the interactions both within and between 
stakeholder groups, the structure of the presentation of the findings below is based on the 
interactions of multiple stakeholders with other stakeholders, the conflicts within the 
individual stakeholder groups and the changing dynamics in the stakeholder interactions over 
time. 
 
4. The local context  
4.1. The mining sector 
Overall, compared to other resource rich countries, Zambia is relatively stable politically and 
is seen as “good” at democracy, ranking high on the Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI) 
at 51% in political stability and with an absence of reported violence (compared, for example 
to 30% for Tanzania) in 2015 (Worldwide Governance Indicator, 2017).  
Within the country, the copper mining industry located in the Copperbelt province has been a 
major contributor to national development and employment. After independence in 1964, the 
industry was nationalised and put under the management of the national parastatal company, 
Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM). As well as contributing to government 
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revenue, ZCCM provided local communities with infrastructure, water, medical care, 
education and other services (Hamann and Kapelus, 2004). As can be seen from Table 1, the 
country remains highly dependent on the sector. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Following the oil crises and falling copper prices from the 1970s to the 1990s, the economy 
collapsed and per capita income declined by 50% during this period, leaving the country the 
25
th
 poorest in the world (Ferguson, 1999, p. 6). This exposed the susceptibility of the 
country’s economy to external factors affecting copper prices, thus highlighting the fragility 
of the Zambian economy, given its reliance on this commodity. International donor support 
was sought and provided but made subject to certain conditions by the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). These Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), 
which include privatisation, formed a significant part of the liberalisation solutions seen as a 
panacea for African postcolonial economies (Adanhounme, 2011). The continuing 
vulnerability of the economy to volatile copper prices can also be observed during the 2007 
global financial crisis when some mining companies had to close (such as Luanshya Copper 
Mines) and others were put under care and maintenance (such as Chambishi Metals). It was 
reported that close to 13,000 of the 30,000 mining and mining related jobs were lost during 
this period (Lungu and Kapena, 2010). 
 
The privatisation of ZCCM during the period 1997-2000, under the World Bank’s guidance, 
resulted in the formation of seven companies which were eventually bought by seven 
Western MNCs. Entry of the MNCs i to the sector marked an important change in its 
management, given its strategic role in national development. With privatisation, there is now 
no restriction on ownership changes, which exposes the sector to systemic pressures for 
“short-term” profit maximisation (Sikka, 2010). Given also fluctuations in world copper 
prices, investors may decide to exit Zambia, only to be replaced by new entrants, thereby 
potentially impacting CSR practices. Whilst the government continues to hold between 10% 
and 20% ownership of the former ZCCM companies, through the state-owned ZCCM 
Investments Holdings (ZCCM-IH), this only minimally entitles the government to mining 
companies’ dividends. However, despite the government’s ownership stake, all available 
evidence suggests that this shareholding gives the government little influence over the 
companies. Overall, the industry landscape has changed dramatically, as now both western 
MNCs and Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are key players. Appendix 2 gives 
details of the major copper mining companies operating in Zambia, showing both ownership 
of the firms and their percentage of total copper production.  
 
Overall, mining activity has increased as new large-scale mining operations have started up 
alongside the former ZCCM companies. The entry of MNCs and SOEs has brought increased 
investment in the sector (International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM), 2014). This 
has resulted in increased copper production, after a significant drop in the 1990s (see Figure 
3). Importantly however, this increase in copper investment has raised stakeholder 
expectations as to mining companies’ sectoral contribution to the country. 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
As the diversity in ownership and mining activities has increased, the state has faced the 
challenge of how to effectively manage the growing sector. Although the state has 
streamlined its ministries and regulatory agencies in recognition of these changes, their 
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capacity remains relatively low according to the Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI), 
with important implications for the regulation of the sector. 
  
4.2.  Stakeholder interaction and demands for change 
Whilst there have been notable benefits as a result of increased MNCs investment, there have 
also been adverse outcomes, raising concerns about the social and environmental 
responsibilities of the mining companies and the inability of the state (or other stakeholders) 
to hold them accountable. Despite an increase in both mining investment and copper revenue, 
the industry’s proportionate contribution to the state revenue remains low (Zambia Revenue 
Authority, 2013), such that there have been reports of tax evasion schemes by some mining 
companies. Importantly from the perspective of power asymmetries, there have been limited 
apparent benefits only, something attributed to the lopsided development agreements that 
these MNCs entered into with the state (Christian Aid, 2011). 
 
Mining companies have arguably failed to prevent, or at least minimise, the adverse impacts 
of their operations (Lungu, 2008a). Within mining townships, there has been major 
deterioration of the social infrastructure, including housing, health, water and sanitation. 
Social infrastructure had previously been the responsibility of the ZCCM, but is now 
undertaken by the municipal councils, whose financial capacity is greatly constrained (Lungu 
and Mulenga, 2005). In turn, concerns over the detrimental effects of mining have given rise 
to civil society activism. With respect to development agreements, for instance, the 
contentious issues relating to taxation and stabilisation clauses that have negative 
implications for state revenues have led to a public outcry that MNCs are “milking the 
country” of revenue (Biau, 2010, p. 23). However, the increasing diversity of investors has 
also meant that CSR prioritisation is not uniform across the sector (Marquis et al., 2007), 
while local communities’ developmental needs are largely ignored in companies’ CSR 
strategies (Van Alstine and Afionis, 2013).  
 
In order to address the resultant widening legitimacy gap between mining companies’ 
activities and community expectations, the Zambian mining sector decided to manage 
stakeholder pressure by creating the Zambia Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative 
(ZEITI) in 2009. The circumstances surrounding the creation of the ZEITI suggest that 
legitimacy is a dynamic notion in that relevant publics continuously evaluate corporate 
output, methods and goals against ever-evolving expectations (Lindblom, 1993). Importantly 
however, this is a legitimation response occurring at the industry level, as opposed to at the 
usual firm level. The ZEITI, whose establishment was also a requirement for financial 
assistance from the World Bank in 2007, became compliant with the Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2012. It acts as a forum which brings together the three key 
stakeholders groups (mining companies, the state and civil society), and produces 
reconciliation reports on what mining companies should pay to the state versus what the state 
receives as revenue from mining companies. As such, it aims to address tensions arising from 
the perceived lack of transparency in the negotiations of mining agreements, the insufficient 
access to information on mining companies’ contributions to the state, and the absence of 
sustained multi-stakeholder dialogue (Zambia Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative, 
2017).  
 
5. Empirical evidence: multidimensional analysis of stakeholder interactions 
As the interactions between stakeholders are complex, we centre our discussion on the 
interaction of a particular key stakeholder group with others.  
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5.1 Interaction of the mining companies with other stakeholders 
The mining companies are largely seen as economically powerful, given both the state’s and 
local populations’ dependence on them for local governance and social welfare. Two civil 
society interviewees, for instance, raise these concerns about the economic dependence of the 
state on mining companies. The state is thought to treat the mining companies “like gods”, 
signing favourable agreements and adopting a soft stance towards them. 
 
You see, if I have the money then I call the shots…the people who have the money are the 
multinationals […], and so they [mining companies] will begin to tell you this can go out now 
given a situation where the multinational companies said, Don’t include this clause, I expect 
that the government is going then to say even if it is good for Zambia, the government is going 
to listen to them [mining companies] and say, Yah that will not include it [C3, p. 9-10]. 
    
The dependence of the state on mining companies can be seen to extend beyond the 
economic to political dependence also, so effectively rendering the state a dependent 
stakeholder (Mitchell et al., 1997). Given the state’s dependence on the mining companies for 
political power, the discourse before elections is considered to be based on the “fear” that 
mining companies will go away if people do not vote for one political party or the other. 
According to one civil society interviewee [C7-2, p. 5], before elections the interests of the 
Zambian state are equated with those of the mining companies, such that if the latter are not 
respected, the population as discretionary stakeholders (Mitchell et al., 1997) will suffer. The 
state as a dependent stakeholder in this case, acts as an advocate for the mining companies 
which, it claims, develop necessary services for discretionary stakeholders, the local 
communities.  
 
Mining companies interact also with civil society by providing information as requested but 
there is a sense of mistrust within the interactions regarding how this information is used. To 
quote one company interviewee: 
 
They [NGOs] came around here but they decided to pick what they wanted to pick.... Because 
they were elections coming so it depended on who they talked to ...did they talk to the junior 
people who may not have the statistics at their fingertips? ...Did they verify this information 
with us, of course they didn’t [M4, p. 5]. 
 
Civil society appears to lack accountability in the eyes of mining companies and is largely 
excluded from the state-business nexus (Siddiqui and Uddin, 2016), something which reduces 
its perceived legitimacy. 
5.1.1. Divisions within mining companies as a key stakeholder group 
We find a significant lack of homogeneity within this group in terms of their ownership and 
CSR priorities, which has been exacerbated by the entry of the Chinese SOEs into the 
Zambian mining sector. Implications of such lack of homogeneity include the divergent 
views of CSR between Western MNCs and Chinese-owned corporates. Indeed, at one 
extreme, for Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), the whole concept of CSR itself is 
argued to either be lacking or else to be very different from that perceived by the Western 
mining companies previously dominating the sector (Frost and Ho, 2005). In this regard, one 
civil society representative commented that: 
 
Some mines, like the Chinese-run mines, have literally not done much. CSR is almost non-
existent for them. They would rather go and give money to the political parties, to the party in 
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power as part of patronage and they take that to be corporate social responsibility, […] they pay 
a blind eye to other issues that may be pertinent to their operations [C9, p. 9]. 
In this situation, the Chinese SOE have identified the political parties as the relevant power 
wielders with whom do business. The local communities, the usual recipients of CSR 
activities are dismissed as being discretionary, and so irrelevant to how the SOEs do business. 
A trade union official, for instance, argued that Chinese companies are new to CSR and have 
not been part of the United Nations Global Compact and other global framework agreements. 
The interviewee refers to discrepancies among mining companies in terms of acknowledging 
critical human and legal rights, such as health and safety (C7-1, p. 15), so undermining the 
establishment of a basis for effective stakeholder dialogue and collaboration (Covey and 
Brown, 2001). This is further echoed by a trade union official who commented on differences 
in Chinese SOEs’ perspectives on labour rights: 
  
Labour laws are something new for Asian colleagues and remuneration and conditions of 
service are worse in mining companies owned by China [C6, p. 4]. 
 
However, interviewees’ critical views as to the role and nature of CSR of mining companies 
are not restricted to Chinese-owned companies. Most non-corporate interviewees see the 
current levels of CSR practice as significantly narrower in scope compared to those before 
privatisation under ZCCM. Civil society interviewees also note that while CSR provisions 
become narrower, mining companies engage in social welfare activities, such as medical 
care, with an aim to make profit.   
 
However, in relation to CSR expectations, a corporate interviewee argues that:  
   
They [i.e. expectations] are not normal because I think our problem is we are moving from a 
situation of ZCCM. These are former mine townships where literally everything was provided 
for. […] The mine provided everything from schools to food. Sometimes even clothes, even 
coffin. So you and your family, you just wake up, go for work, the kids go to school and 
whatever… Now they are moving into a situation where suddenly you own a house, you must 
maintain it (emphasis added) [M1, p. 13-14]. 
 
Here, we note that the conditions and provisions offered by the mining companies under the 
ZCCM ownership continue to colour the expectations of the community. In the absence of 
power or urgent claims by the stakeholders and the local community (Mitchell et al., 1997), 
there is no pressure on managers or mining companies to actively engage in corporate 
relationships with them or respond to their expectations. However, despite this lack of 
pressure on mining companies, there have been some changing dynamics in companies’ 
interactions with other stakeholders as these gain power and legitimacy, so potentially 
increasing their salience.  
 
5.2. The interaction of the state with other stakeholders 
Power asymmetries in the state’s interaction with mining companies have been reinforced 
and heightened by its capacity constraints in many different areas. Interviewees indicated 
constraints such as the failure to monitor CSR processes due to constraints including lack of 
manpower and equipment, funding problems in local municipal councils, changes in demand 
for service provision without corresponding changes to funding, lack of political support to 
engage professionally with stakeholders, and lack of legal enforcement. The effect of such 
capacity constraints is that the ‘significant preparatory groundwork’ (Hamann et al., 2005, p. 
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6) needed to establish appropriate conditions for effective stakeholder collaboration is 
lacking. This effectively results in a state that is toothless, with regulatory powers but without 
enforcement capability. These problems are summarised aptly by interviewee W1, from the 
supranational financial institution: 
 
… [on the unfair practices like transfer pricing] the government knew what was happening but 
did not have the capacity to give conclusive evidence that this is what was happening. They 
knew it was happening, because they knew that the company which is allegedly supplying 
materials to the other company is actually owned by it. [Thus] the private sector at any point in 
time when they want to hide monies or carry out these activities [such as transfer pricing] is 
much cleverer than the government [W1, p. 11]. 
 
Furthermore, these capacity constraints have been complicated by geographical distance 
(Hamann and Kapelus, 2004). In the view of one civil society interviewee, for instance,                                                                                                                  
power asymmetry is exacerbated by geographical distance which helps to perpetuate the 
secrecy around the CSR activities of mining companies: 
 
The whole system has been undermined by….the secrecy that has eliminated all forms of 
transparency and accountability by stakeholders …Because what accrues to the central 
government is used maybe in Lusaka and you don’t see it reflecting on the Copperbelt where 
the primary activities are being undertaken [C9, p. 9-10]. 
 
A number of civil society interviewees highlight the secrecy in terms of the lack of 
engagement and communication with the community regarding dealings between the state 
and mining companies. This exclusion was particularly evident during the privatisation of the 
mines, marking the beginning of the current stakeholder power imbalances. As the 
interviewee explains below, civil society was left ignorant of the relevant development 
agreements, resulting in a lack of transparency and accountability with regard to the 
relationship between the state and the mines. The lack of participation of stakeholders in 
national reforms or policies then increases power differentials (Brinkerhoff, 1999).  
 
(The) civil society in Zambia has not been involved in the negotiation for the sale of (the) 
mines. …Civil society has not been privy to the provisions within those agreements and that 
has been a bone of contention [C3, p. 10-12]. 
 
As a result, there is a lack of information available regarding the taxes paid by the mining 
companies to both central and local state authorities, thereby undermining and indeed 
eliminating any possible critical collaboration with other stakeholders (Covey and Brown, 
2001): 
 
Also the government does not want to fully disclose how much they are getting from the mines. 
The mine outfits then also are kind of forced into submission in silence, because they feel that, 
if they say something, it will be contrary to the spirit of engagement with the government and 
they feel that they are accountable to the government, who are the licensing authority [C9, p. 9-
10, emphasis added]. 
 
Here, some complexity is identified in the relationship between the state and the mining 
companies, in that corporates appear to be forced into silence regarding how much they pay 
to the state in various taxes. Indeed, the companies feel accountable to the government as 
another key stakeholder, because it acts in some sense as a power wielder, being the licensing 
authority. This situation results in a vicious cycle of interactions that leads to yet more 
secrecy and lack of engagement with other stakeholders by both the corporates and the state.  
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Moreover, the perceived challenges to power asymmetries posed by initiatives, such as the 
ZEITI, that aim to heighten both the transparency and accountability of mining corporations 
and state, are hampered in different ways. One way in which the current power asymmetries 
between stakeholders are maintained is through the composition of the ZEITI. The ZEITI is 
seen as biased by certain sections of civil society in giving power to the state and mining 
companies in terms of deciding which civil society organisations are involved. Indeed, the 
state is alleged to ‘pick’ civil society representatives so that in the words of interviewee C15: 
… if you look at the EITI composition, now I think the mining company actually has a stronger 
hand than the civil society even the composition of the board I think currently (the) government 
and mining companies have a say on who as civil society is supposed to be…. and it’s not 
something where they can actually call even like all the civil society working on the extractives 
to take a vote to say, ok who should represent us? … (the) government actually does choose the 
civil society to engage with-they have the pretty much top say as to who talk to, who they 
engage and things like that [C15, p. 6, emphasis added]. 
The establishment of the ZEITI appears to offer symbolic legitimation to the mining sector in 
that changes are introduced for the sake of appearances as opposed to more substantive 
legitimation (Deegan, 2014). Despite symbolic legitimation usually being discussed in 
relation to corporate behaviour, here we see the state-business nexus (Siddiqui and Uddin) as 
an entity exhibiting such behaviour. Such influence reinforces the existing power 
asymmetries by weakening potential challenges from civil society as the state and mining 
companies join forces to prevent civil society from exercising power in the one forum where 
this might be possible. 
 
5.2.1. Divisions within the state as a key stakeholder 
In general, divisions within the stakeholder groups themselves exacerbate the impact of 
power asymmetries on CSR practices. Besides the overall dependence of the state on mining 
companies, its capacity constraints and the exclusion of civil society, the power of the state is 
further weakened by internal divisions. In the view of one state employee: 
 
It’s important that our politicians understand how institutions run so that whatever political 
direction they give, it’s in line with the way the institutions run [G1, p. 14].   
 
The influence of the state on mining companies is hampered by the absence of a united front 
with politicians, resulting from a poor understanding of the nature and mechanics of the 
various state institutions. Another interviewee from civil society argues that political will on 
the part of central government is key to addressing the challenges faced by governmental 
agencies monitoring the mining sector [C10, p. 3].  
 
The state’s perceived weakness in negotiating with mining companies is recognised by state 
stakeholders, who often refer to power imbalances and political collusion within state 
agencies. Political interference in state regulatory agencies undermines the ability of various 
state agencies to discharge their obligations appropriately. Interviewee G6, working for the 
Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA), indicates that they need political support to engage 
professionally with any stakeholder, especially the mining companies. Another interviewee 
representing the Zambia Environmental Management Agency (ZEMA) provided examples of 
political interference in an appeal process: 
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…we had some appeal process [related to mining companies’ violations of environmental 
standards and principles] which is in our role and sometimes ministers have reserved their 
appeal rights and made decisions. Sometimes they don’t agree with us’. [G4-1, p. 5] 
Decomposing the state, therefore, into one of its most important constituents or ministries 
further illustrates the divisions within state agencies. As expected, the ZRA acts as a vital 
conduit in the relationship between the mining companies and the state, given its role as tax 
collector. This is clearly important, given the high percentage of Zambian tax revenue arising 
from the mining sector. However, one civil society interviewee alleges: 
 
Sometimes the Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA) officers when they go to audit the mining 
books, they have been sent away to say we are not ready, you can come back after six months. 
But that’s illegal by law and they tell you this is not your system, (when) this should be the case 
where you should go and (just) say this is what it is. My system says this and you should do it. 
Pay me this much but your books say you haven’t paid this much [C5, p. 16]. 
 
Based on interviewees’ accounts in relation to mining companies’ power versus that of the 
state generally, and versus the ZRA, there is clear evidence that corporates are seen as 
occupying unambiguously the role of power wielders (Mitchell et al., 1997). Given the 
particular weaknesses in the state’s ability to collect taxes, this has knock-on effects on the 
proper functioning of other state institutions.  
 
Lauwo et al. (2016) argue that NGOs have some potential for stepping into a regulatory gap 
resulting from inadequacies at the level of both national governments and international 
institutions in demanding increased public accountability (Moon and Vogel, 2008). However, 
in the case of Zambia, there are further complications. 
 
5.3. The interaction of civil society with other stakeholders 
Apart from civil society being seen to reside outside the state-business nexus, mining 
companies’ interaction with civil society organisations is perceived to be complex, as the 
leadership of both stakeholder groups is not always seen as either accountable or legitimate 
by the other. As already discussed in section 5.1., mining companies interact with civil 
society by providing information. However, mining companies appear to question the 
judgment of civil society activists, both in terms of whom they choose to speak to and of their 
understanding as to the appropriateness of the data chosen. This questioning echoes, to some 
extent, the comments of the supranational financial institution interviewee as to the lack of 
accountability and analytical skills of civil society activists.  
 
Whilst mining companies may mistrust civil society, such sentiments are mutual. For 
example, one civil society interviewee, using the “master-slave” analogy to describe what 
s/he perceives as this unequal relationship, indicates that, currently, the Zambian community 
(represented by civil society) and the mining companies are not seen as equal partners who 
co-exist responsibly and profit jointly from the natural resources of the country. Instead, 
mining companies are seen as foreign visitors. 
  
So if it [CSR] is seen as charity, it is like a far-fetched relationship, where one is a master and 
one is a slave, one owns and then out of his own goodwill and volition he can give some 
crumbs to the slave. That is not it …the people in those communities own the land and 
therefore they own the natural resources that exist within that area and the mines are visitors 
who have come to undertake business activities there. …CSR should be seen as a form of 
responsible co-existence. It consolidates the partnership of the inhabitants of the land …this 
why we associate all the mining firms with the foreign direct investment, because they are 
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foreigners who have come to invest directly in those areas, so they are visitors [C9, p. 6 
emphasis added]. 
 
From the viewpoint of civil society, CSR should be is viewed as a legitimating tool by 
mining companies which, as foreigners, invest in Zambia and so profit from resources that 
are actually owned by the local inhabitants.  
 
However, despite civil society activism, this stakeholder group too is beset by internal 
divisions. 
5.3.1. Divisions within civil society as a key stakeholder 
The divisions that exist within civil society (and specifically NGOs) exacerbate the power 
asymmetries especially considering that this stakeholder group is meant to act in the public 
good and is a potential source of surrogate accountability. The state is seen as interfering with 
the independence of this stakeholder group thereby weakening its moderating role. One 
academic interviewee (who has worked widely with local NGOs) commented that the 
government usually “selects those civil society organisations that are seen as in favour of 
government, excluding as much as possible, those who were seen as critical to government 
action” [A1, p. 8] in national policy debates so hindering prospects for critical stakeholder 
collaboration (Covey and Brown, 2001). 
 
In other cases, the agenda of some civil society organisations is questioned. One civil society 
interviewee referred to instances where civil society groups were formed explicitly to 
promote a specific agenda for the state: 
 
We have various examples, particularly towards the elections, of civil society [groups] whose 
interest (sic) were based on whether they had been given money or not. For example, when the 
national constitutional conference was required to submit people but because the churches 
boycotted, some reverends went into the villages, formed churches and brought people there; 
that is not genuine representation” [C16, p. 10]. 
 
These divisions effectively weaken the lobbying capacity of civil society and so sustain 
existing power asymmetries.  
 
5.4. Changing dynamics in the stakeholder interactions 
Despite such weakened potential of civil society, stakeholders’ power positions can change 
over time (Kochan and Rubinstein, 2000) even with respect to weaker stakeholders in their 
attempt to regain power vis-a-vis the mining companies. 
5.4.1. Civil society attempts to change the rules of the game 
Despite the exclusion of civil society from having meaningful dialogue and influence on CSR 
agendas and developments, civil society organisations (mainly NGOs) have become more 
powerful over time due to improved access to key information contained in both development 
and investment agreements, so enabling them to assume the role of surrogate account holders 
on behalf of the community and enhance the potential for critical collaboration: 
 
Over time, civil society has mobilised and they have built a critical mass and they have become 
a force. They voice on things that they see and also through some of the whistle blower 
opportunities that have come up. They have had access to some of the information contained 
within the development agreements and the investment agreements with the mines…The 
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government was compromised because the mines, usually are usually powerful multinational 
corporations, so they have very shrewd negotiating teams and they usually engage highly 
skilled negotiation teams which capacity we don’t usually find in the public sector and as a 
result they come out with a raw deal [C3, p. 10-12]. 
 
Given this power asymmetry evident in the negotiating capacities of the public sector 
compared to the corporates, civil society has actively sought to change the rules of the game 
altogether, for example by co-opting donors to strengthen the state’s power. This attempted 
intervention is described by the same civil society interviewee as follows: 
 
And that is something that civil society has been trying to champion with the co-operating 
partners, the donor community, that they can help the country in negotiating these deals or in 
building capacity within the government institutions be, it in negotiating as well as in 
administering and regulating the mining sector as a whole [C3, p. 10-12]. 
 
In seeking to build the state’s negotiating capacity, civil society is trying to co-opt the state as 
an ally, rather than remaining outside the state-business nexus as an adversary. Importantly, 
donors, whilst not highly visible stakeholders in our analysis to date, possess (utilitarian) 
power (Etzioni, 1964) to impose their will on the state by threatening to withdraw funding 
(Combes et al., 2016; Heller, 1975). Additionally, civil society aims to increase its persuasive 
power (Neville and Menguc, 2006) through building capability with the state in terms of 
administering and regulating the mining sector, with the objective of increasing corporate 
accountability and transparency. In so doing, civil society is linking itself to another key but 
usually dormant or silent stakeholder, the donor community, to develop its own moral 
legitimacy (Baur and Palazzo, 2011). In Mitchell et al.'s (1997) terms, by this action civil 
society is attempting to raise its own salience in influencing CSR outcomes by increasing its 
own legitimacy. 
 
Whilst mining companies and the state, as a coalition, regard civil society as an adversary, 
civil society has, on several occasions, used other power-based strategies, including legal 
recourse, to balance power asymmetries (Hamann et al., 2005). For example, in 2002, a 
particular NGO in Zambia took one of the mining companies to international arbitration over 
breaches of the development agreement on pollution. Whilst initially the state failed to 
cooperate with this particular NGO, in the end it had to find an “amicable solution” because 
“that was what shareholders wanted also”. To quote C12: 
 
The shareholders want(s) us to find the amicable solution to this-would be transparent, to be 
open, will allow them to come and do audits to inspect(ion) us and give us recommendations on 
what must be done, government had no option but to fall in place, so it works out well [C12, p. 
15]. 
 
As a result of this activism, as was the objective in the earlier example, the NGO was able to 
change the dynamics of its relationship with the mining companies, through acting as 
surrogate account holder, by means of a perhaps unexpected intervention by company 
shareholders, normally dormant stakeholders (Mitchell et al., 1997). Whilst the Zambian state 
usually negotiates and cooperates with mining companies’ senior management, in a state-
business nexus, ultimately the western corporates are accountable to the shareholder 
community. In this particular example, civil society gained normative/moral-based legitimacy 
(Baur and Palazzo, 2011; Black, 2008) in its campaign through the support of shareholders 
who perceived “the goals and/or procedures of the organisation (i.e. of this particular NGO) 
to be morally appropriate” (Siddiqui and Uddin, 2016, p. 684). 
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In both cases of NGO activism being successful in co-opting either donors or MNC 
shareholders, and so acting as a surrogate account holder, these previously silent or dormant 
stakeholders became more salient because they both exercise ultimate power over financial 
resources critical to the Zambian state and mining companies respectively. Whilst both may 
be seen as largely dormant in terms of their influence, if called upon to exert their power, as 
in the example above, they show themselves to be major power wielders. However, there are 
limitations on the extent to which civil society can rely on shareholder pressure to further its 
aims with regard to its CSR agenda. Shareholder pressure favouring CSR can prove itself to 
be both narrow and limited to the financial interests of MNCs’ shareholders, as in the view of 
the interviewee from the supranational financial institution, W1 (p.8), “…if the corporate 
social responsibility activities are going to start affecting (the) bottom line, they will stop it”. 
 
Other complicating factors include the relatively rapid turnover in ownership of the 
corporates operating in Zambia, and the different national origins of the various firms with 
diverse perspectives on CSR. These effectively limit the urgency of claims (Mitchell et al., 
1997) for CSR reforms. However, more positively, some change is evident in the power of 
the other key stakeholder, the state, at least from the perspective of a number of state 
interviewees. 
 
5.4.2. The state becoming more powerful versus in the past 
Despite continued secrecy on the part of the state-business nexus, the supranational financial 
institution stakeholder argues that the state is now more sophisticated, notwithstanding civil 
society claims to the contrary [W1, p.5]. Similarly, state stakeholders argue that, over the last 
few years, the state has regained power vis-a-vis the mining companies due both to path 
dependence and civil society activism. Such increased power is evident through improved 
legislative monitoring and power-based strategies, such as legal recourse and threats. These 
interviewees (e.g. G3) make comparisons with the state’s position at the time of negotiating 
the sale of the mining companies, which was forced upon the Zambian state, versus the 
current situation relative to the mining companies. Specifically, the state is now much better 
placed to renegotiate agreements with the mining companies without being forced to amend 
the law in order to do so, such power being, in part, due to path dependence. 
 
Path dependence arose in a specific case when the state was forced to take over the running 
of a particular mine. Once the state had proved it could run the mine, it increased its 
perceived credibility in future negotiations, thus indicating the importance of reputation-
building. To quote one of the company interviewees: 
 
When Anglo-American walked out in 2002 from KCM mines, the government put in an interim 
team to run the operations. I think that gave some comfort to government that it can be done 
because (the) mines were run for one year with a team put into place and supervised by 
government directly. So when the recession came in 2006, they had a history. That is why they 
could stand up and negotiate very strongly to say, “You cannot just shut down”. There is a way 
in which things should be done [Μ1, p. 12, emphasis added]. 
 
Whilst legitimacy theory research is frequently concerned with the issue of corporate 
disclosures for reputation-building purposes (e.g. Tilling and Tilt, 2010), here we observe 
something quite different. A non-corporate stakeholder, the state, manages to increase its 
legitimacy and power, by evolving from the position of dependent stakeholder to a much 
more salient one (Mitchell et al., 1997) because if we adopt a longer-term perspective than 
Mitchell et al. (1997), we see that ‘history matters.’ In this particular case, the Zambian state 
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proves that it can run the mine, so adding considerably to its credibility and bargaining 
power. This change, which is path dependent in the above sense, gives the state “a history”, 
and to some extent enables it to change the rules of the game governing the relationship 
between the state and the mining companies, previously characterised by stark power 
asymmetry.  
 
In summary, our analysis reveals that the various mining companies operating in Zambia 
emerge as power wielders (Mitchell et al., 1997) in their relationship with the state and civil 
society, given the importance of copper mining to the economy. Reinforcing this power 
asymmetry within the state-business nexus is the exclusion of civil society, which views itself 
as having the potential to strengthen the power of the state in the interests of the wider 
community. However, this position is continually eroded, albeit to a relatively small degree, 
by other stakeholders. These dynamics arise from legitimating actions of other stakeholders 
which increase their salience (Mitchell et al., 1997). Apart from the persistent power 
imbalances within and between stakeholders, the potential for critical collaboration at the 
local level (Covey and Brown, 2001; Hamann et al., 2005) is further challenged by the lack 
of commonly accepted social and environmental laws and agreements, the lack of 
information and accountability of the leadership of other stakeholder groups. However, civil 
society is seen to be actively trying to change the old rules of the game by co-opting both 
donors and some MNC shareholders, with the aim of strengthening state power versus the 
MNCs. However, given the transitory nature of power, such success may be short-lived.  
 
 
6.  Discussion and conclusions 
In exploring the interactions of key stakeholders, and their impact upon CSR practices in the 
Zambian copper mining sector, we have identified stark power asymmetries present in the 
relationship between the mining companies and the state. These power asymmetries continue 
despite attempted interventions by civil society. They remain masked, in the language of 
proportionate partnership in the agreements signed by mining companies and the state, and 
are exacerbated by a number of issues including divisions within the state and civil society 
themselves.  
 
Given this background, our wider contributions to the literature on CSR in developing 
countries are as follows. Firstly, our focus on the complexity of major stakeholder 
interactions in the Zambian mining sector does not place companies at the centre of analysis. 
Instead, the multiple stakeholders are seen as being interrelated and as constituting part of a 
web of complex local relationships. With regard to our second contribution, we also critically 
engage with the role of the state as an important stakeholder, something that has received 
limited attention in CSR studies in developing countries (Idemudia, 2011; Jamali and Karam, 
2016). A third substantial contribution is that we refine Mitchell et al.'s (1997) stakeholder 
salience framework which has been criticised as being static and short-term in orientation 
(Baba and Raufflet, 2017) by instead, locating stakeholder interactions within a complex 
system of irregular, non-linear and path dependent (Hamann et al, 2005) activities taking 
place over time, with consequences for the evolution of stakeholder power. A fourth 
contribution, is that within these stakeholder groups, we find a lack of homogeneity, so 
affecting CSR outcomes. This lack of homogeneity is particularly noticeable within the 
mining companies as a stakeholder group which includes Chinese State (SOEs). Finally, our 
fifth contribution which is highly significant given the stark power asymmetries existing 
between the state and the corporates, lies in the subtlety we add to the concept of the state-
business nexus (Siddiqui and Uddin, 2016) and the potential of ‘surrogate accountability’ to 
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hold powerful stakeholders into account, so strengthening the position of less powerful 
stakeholders (Belal et al., 2015; Rubenstein, 2007). 
 
Drawing from our multi-theoretical approach attending to stakeholder salience and critical 
collaboration, we find that some agency (albeit limited), is possible, particularly on the part 
of civil society but also of the state. Indeed, whilst the state may often find itself in an 
adversarial position relative to civil society, both interventions by the latter discussed in the 
findings above are undertaken by CSOs with the aim of empowering the state in its 
relationship with mining companies, with the end objective of changing the rules of the game. 
We therefore, add some subtlety to understanding the role of a surrogate in promoting 
accountability (Belal et al., 2015) as civil society has assumed this role. Importantly however, 
with regards to meeting community expectations, due to path dependence in the form of 
memories of comprehensive service provision by ZCCM under state ownership, this proves 
impossible under private ownership of the mines. Under privatisation, due both to the variety 
in national ownership of the companies and their short-termist focus, as well as the absence 
of a state regulatory framework, CSR practices within Zambia lack coherence. However, now 
that the state is perceived as increasing its power to a limited extent, some change is 
considered possible by a number of stakeholders, consistent with our perspective of power as 
being transitory and of relationships not being fixed (Kochan and Rubinstein, 2000). 
 
Exploration of the dynamics underlying the interaction of key stakeholders in Zambia reveals 
certain similarities but also important differences from research to date. Major similarities to 
other relevant research on developing countries include an institutional context characterised 
both by the absence of political will by the state, and by its capacity constraints to which 
finding we add our own of capacity constraints on the part of civil society. Most importantly, 
perhaps arising from such an institutional context, are stark power asymmetries between the 
state, anxious to attract foreign direct investments (FDI), and mining companies (Siddiqui 
and Uddin, 2016). The resultant alliance between the state and MNCs means that not only 
does the general population find itself excluded, but so also do their representatives in the 
form of CSOs. Indeed, in our study, civil society interviewees are largely united in regarding 
themselves as outsiders to the relationship between mining companies and the state.  
 
Another contribution of our paper is the addition of subtlety to the concept of the state-
business nexus (Siddiqui and Uddin, 2016). Mining companies appear to dictate to the 
Zambian state the terms on which they choose to operate, but we find that the alliance is 
perhaps not as straightforward as first thought. From these perspectives, the state-business 
relationship in Zambia may be more complex than the master-slave analogy used by one civil 
society interviewee to describe the relationship between the local community and mining 
companies. Instead, whilst undoubtedly there is substantial power asymmetry, there is also 
some (probably limited) mutuality implied as the identities of the so-called power wielders or 
dominant stakeholders (Mitchell et al., 1997) become more nuanced, and subject to change, 
than is implied in much of the literature on CSR in developing countries. However, ZEITI, 
ostensibly a collaborative forum set up at the request of World Bank but allegedly biased so 
as to exclude genuine debate and accountability, appears to have failed as a potential 
surrogate account holder holding mining companies to account, despite appearances to the 
contrary and the symbolic legitimation it has offered the mining companies. On the other 
hand, NGOs were able to change the dynamics of their relationship with the mining 
companies, by acting as surrogate account holder, by means of the intervention by company 
shareholders and donors. In undertaking this dynamic analysis of the relationship of key 
stakeholders, we contribute by introducing a dynamic analysis into Mitchell et al.'s (1997) 
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salience framework which has been criticised as being static and short-term in orientation 
(Baba and Raufflet, 2017). Hamann et al.'s (1995) stakeholder interaction framework 
encompasses local African contexts and addresses the complexity of such interactions within 
and outside the immediate ambit of mining companies. Stakeholder interactions are not 
predictable or linear, while actions are path-dependent, i.e. shaped by previous developments. 
There are also discrepancies or conflicts between individuals or sections within stakeholder 
groups.  
 
Therefore, with respect to the concept of power wielders (Mitchell et al., 1997), usually 
assumed in the CSR in developing country literature to be the mining companies, we do not 
hear consistent messages from this stakeholder group. Indeed, our analysis suggests that there 
are many competing voices within the same stakeholder group, thus adding another layer of 
complexity to the interaction between key stakeholder groups and their effects upon CSR 
practices. Specifically, we find CSR to be an alien concept to the Chinese SOEs, while the 
country in which the organisation is reporting and that of ultimate ownership appear to have a 
significant effect on CSR (see also Adam, 2002). The Chinese SOEs’ approach is, perhaps, 
understandable as these firms are largely shielded from the international legitimation 
pressures facing the western, publicly-quoted MNCs. If correct, this helps to support our 
argument regarding the importance of legitimation pressures on companies, notwithstanding 
that the relevant legitimation pressures emanate perhaps primarily from the parent company 
based overseas, not from the local communities affected by the firms’ operations. 
 
Indeed, this phenomenon of parent companies increasing interest in CSR, where civil society 
was able to co-opt MNC shareholder support, highlights a potential limitation in our analysis. 
This relates to the fact that we have focused our attention largely on the Zambian context. A 
fuller analysis of global factors interacting with outcomes in Zambian copper mining would 
have highlighted further relevant phenomena in more detail, including increased international 
concern with such matters of business ethics. Further relevant issues could perhaps include 
factors influencing the activities of mining companies based in different countries such as 
China, a relatively new entrant to Zambia, and consider specifically their impact on 
stakeholder dynamics. 
 
Implications of incorporating into our analysis a perspective which views changes taking 
place in different time scales include that, rather than focusing simply on a situation of 
unchanging stark power asymmetries, we search for and indeed, find something different. 
What we see instead is an institutional context in the form of a subtly changing picture like a 
kaleidoscope, in which the identity of power wielders changes, leading to something of a 
state of flux. Our focus on activities at the micro level, by individual stakeholders primarily 
using various legitimation techniques, shifts perhaps only slightly the overall balance of 
power as path dependence means that previous success changes perceptions and accepted 
practice.  
 
However, we accept that such changes appear to be relatively minor, as dictated by the 
overall context in which the sector is of such importance to the Zambian economy. The 
copper mining sector in Zambia holds a paradoxical role in the country, as it is both a heavy 
contributor to the country’s economic development and a potential obstacle to its future 
development (Belal et al., 2015). In the case of Zambia, this is perhaps even truer than the 
Bangladeshi example, given that copper is both a wasting asset[4] and the cause of 
substantial environmental degradation. Importantly, whilst we consider the socio-political 
and economic background in our overall analysis of the dynamics of key stakeholder 
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interactions and of their effects upon CSR practices, we acknowledge this to constitute only a 
start, limited by the sheer scale of undertaking such a study. Specifically, while we have 
taken a multi-theoretical approach and utilised concepts such as stakeholder salience 
(Mitchell et al., 1997) and critical collaboration (Covey and Brown, 2001) in order to analyse 
practice at the micro level, we acknowledge the developments and criticisms of such 
theorisations (e.g. Baba and Raufflet, 2017; Frynas and Yamahaki, 2016; Jonker and Foster, 
2002; Neville et al., 2011), and appreciate that other theorisations could have been employed 
profitably in the analysis at the micro level to explore further detailed cases of power 
asymmetry in both Zambia and  in other contexts characterised by stark power asymmetries. 
 
Further, although we have interviewed two trade union officials and a representative from the 
House of Chiefs representing local communities, we have not included the perspectives of 
actual non-managerial employees, specifically miners. As miners are the stakeholders 
perhaps most affected by mining companies’ operations, further research could profitably 
employ approaches such as “oral history” (Hammond and Sikka, 1996), to give a voice to 
those who have been largely silent to date. At the other end of the spectrum of key 
stakeholders, further research could specifically address the views of the so-called owners of 
the mining companies, likely to be major institutional shareholders in the case of the Western 
MNCs. For the other mining companies in this study, this approach would have to be adapted 
appropriately according to their nationality and relevant ownership structures. Whilst the 
financialisation literature (e.g. Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000) often suggests that the 
corporate pursuit of shareholder value may have adverse consequences for less powerful 
stakeholders, the earlier example cited of shareholder pressure in favour of CSR indicates that 
this may not always be the case.  
 
This study has focused on the dynamic interaction of stakeholders shaping CSR outcomes 
and has provided some evidence as to its wider implications for issues of accountability and 
transparency. Considering the importance of transparency and stakeholder accountability in 
the context of developing countries, further research could study in more detail the different 
aspects of accountability of the mining companies in particular vis-á-vis other marginalised 
stakeholders (Jamali and Karam, 2016). Whilst the current study has focused largely on the 
current dynamics of pressures within Zambia, either in favour of or against CSR, future work 
could draw on the post-colonial literature in particular to explore how Zambia’s colonial past, 
neoliberal reforms and integration into global markets continue to shape the social and 
structural conditions that determine the future of CSR and development in the country. 
 
Notes 
(1) In this paper, we assume a broad conception of CSR based on the definition of the World Business Council 
for Sustainable Development as “the commitment of business to contribute to sustainable economic 
development, working with employees, their families, the local community and society at large to improve 
their quality of life” (World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), 2002, p. 2).   
(2) Here we make a distinction between legitimacy and legitimation (Lindblom, 1994) in the application of 
legitimacy theory. Legitimacy is “a condition or status which exists when an entity’s value system is 
congruent with the value system of the larger social system of which the entity is a part” (Lindblom, 1994, 
p. 2) while “legitimation is the process whereby an organization justifies to a peer or superordinate system 
its right to exist” (Maurer, 1971, p. 361). 
(3) The interview protocol is available on request from the authors. 
(4) A wasting asset is a natural resource (such as copper, coal, gas, oil, ores) that gets depleted, without 
replacement, through continued extraction. As the resource is being extracted, a day must come when it will 
be exhausted. 
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[Appendix 1: Detailed list of interviewees, about here] 
 
 
[Appendix 2: Major Mining Company operations in Zambia, about here] 
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Figure 1: Stakeholder Typology 
 
1 - Dangerous Stakeholder 
2 - Dominant Stakeholder 
3 - Dependent Stakeholder 
4 - Definitive Stakeholder 
Source: adapted from Mitchell et al. (1997, p. 874) 
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Figure 2: Stakeholder interaction in the copper mining sector in Zambia 
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Arrows depict formal and informal interactions or relationships among stakeholders 
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Figure 3: Zambian Copper Production 1963 – 2014 
 
Source: International Council on Mining and Metals, 2014; Zambia Chamber of Mines, 2014 
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Table 1: Mining contribution to Zambian economy (2012) 
Source: International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM), (2014); Oxford Policy Management (OPM), 
(2013) 
 
 
 Zambia Typical share in other mineral 
dependent countries 
Foreign exchange earnings 80% 30%-60% 
Gross domestic product >12% 3%-10% 
Foreign direct investment 86% 60%-90% 
Government revenue >25% 3%-20% 
Direct employment 1.7% 1% 
Formal sector employment 8.3%  
Private sector formal employment 25%  
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APPENDIX 1: DETAILED LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
 
Civil Society Organisations 
Interview 
No. Nature of Civil society Network Position of interviewee 
C1 Transparency/corruption International Chapter President 
C2 Dialogue Local Executive Director 
C3 Transparency International Chairperson 
C4 Education/Advocacy Local/Regional Programme Officer 
C5 Human development Local/International 
Program 
Officer/Coordinator 
C9 Economic policies Local President 
C10 Accountancy body Local/International Chief Executive Officer 
C11 Media Regional Programme Officer-Media 
C12 Environment Local Executive Director 
C13 Poverty International Country Director 
C14 Local community Local Head - Researcher 
C15 Trade policies International Programme Officer 
C16 Dialogue Regional Executive Director 
Mine Workers Union 
C6 Workers union Local President 
C7 Workers union Local Director 
Mining companies 
Interview 
No. 
Country of origin Position of interviewee 
M1 
Continental Europe, 
Canada 
Manager- HSE 
M2-1 
Europe, Other Asia 
Community Development Officer 
M2-2 Group Manager- SHE 
M3 
China 
China 
China 
Chief Service Officer 
M4 Deputy-Chief Executive Officer 
M5-1,  
M5-2 
Mine Manager 
Community Development Officer 
M6 Canada 
Canada 
Canada 
CSR Coordinator 
M7 Environmental Manager 
M8 Director-Corporate Affairs 
M9 Continental Europe Head-Human Resources 
M10-1 
Zambia 
Environmental Manager 
M10-2 Company Geologist 
M11 South Africa Chief Executive Officer 
Government ministries, regulatory agencies and municipal councils 
Interview 
No. 
Ministry/department 
G1, G2-2, 
G2-3 
Ministry of Mines and Minerals Development 
G3-1, G3-2, 
G3-3 
Ministry of Labour and Social Security 
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G4-1, G4-2 Zambia Environmental Management Agency (ZEMA) 
G5 Ministry of Finance and National Planning/Bank of Zambia 
Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA) G6 
G7 Ministry of Justice 
CC1 Mufulira Municipal Council 
CC2 Kitwe City Council 
Academia 
Interview 
No. 
Organisation/Nature of 
organisation 
Position of interviewee 
A1 Copperbelt University Professor 
A2 University of Zambia Senior Lecturer 
Supranational organisations 
W1 Supranational financial 
institution 
Sector Specialist 
Other organisations/Initiatives 
O1-1, O1-2 Extractive Industries 
Transparency 
Vice Chairperson-ZEITI 
Head-EITI 
O2 Sustainable livelihood 
organisation 
Executive Director 
C8 Mining Association General Manager 
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1 
 
APPENDIX 2: MAJOR MINING COMPANY OPERATIONS IN ZAMBIA 
 
Name of Mine Output 
percent* 
Ownership Country of 
origin 
Commodities 
Mined 
Kansanshi 
Mining Plc 
35.07% First Quantum Minerals Ltd 
(80%); ZCCM Investment 
Holding Plc (20%) 
Canada Copper, gold 
Lumwana 
Mining Plc 
21.92% Barrick Gold Corporation (100%) Canada Copper, cobalt, 
gold 
Konkola 
Copper Mines 
20.73% Vedanta Resources Plc (79%); 
ZCCM Investment Holdings Plc 
(21%) 
United 
Kingdom and 
India 
Copper, cobalt 
Mopani 
Copper Mines 
14.75% Glencore Xstrata Plc (73%); First 
Quantum Minerals Ltd 
(17%); ZCCM Investments 
Holdings PLC (10%) 
Switzerland; 
Canada 
Copper, cobalt 
NFC Africa 
Mining Plc 
3.29% China Non-ferrous Mining Corp 
Ltd (85%); ZCCM Investments 
Holdings Plc 
(15%) 
China Copper, cobalt 
Chibuluma 
Mines Plc 
2.66% Jinchuan (85%); ZCCM 
Investments Holdings Plc 
(15%) 
China Copper, cobalt 
CNMC 
Luanshya 
Copper Mines 
1.58% China Non-ferrous Mining Corp 
Ltd (80%); ZCCM Investments 
Holdings Plc 
(20%) 
China Copper, cobalt 
* This is based on 2010 copper production figures (Source: Ministry of Mines and Minerals Development 
(MMMD), 2010) 
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Authors’ Response to the Editor’s Comments 
Journal: Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal  
Manuscript ID: AAAJ-04-2016-2540 
Title of Paper: Stakeholder interaction and Corporate Social Responsibility(CSR) practices: 
evidence from the Zambian copper mining sector (revised title)  
Date Sent: 21/11/2017 
 
Comment 1: 
The contribution of the paper needs to be clearer. It is not enough to say that oh, no such a 
study has been done on Africa (though the special issue is on Africa). What is the gap in the 
literature that this paper is trying to fill beyond the African context? What is it about 
stakeholder interaction and CSR that we do not know?  Why is studying this interaction 
important? The authors have tried to engage with this issue somewhat in section 2.1 and this 
material must be moved to the fore more forcefully to demonstrate that there is a contribution 
the paper is making. I do not believe that this will be difficult to do. 
 
 
Response 1: 
We appreciate the editor’s comment and, in the revised manuscript, have made the 
contributions clearer.  
 
In particular, in the first paragraph of the introduction we discuss the motivations of the 
study, acknowledging the increasing research interest in accounting and CSR in Africa (e.g. 
Rahaman, 2010).  
 
In the second paragraph, we identify the literature that focuses on the interaction of 
stakeholders in the CSR arena in developing countries (e.g. Jamali and Keshishian, 2009, 
Lauwo and Otusanya, 2014; Newell, 2005; Siddiqui and Uddin, 2016). These studies focus 
on the problematic business-state nexus perpetuating human rights violations by MNCs in 
developing countries, and the interactions between other stakeholders such as NGOs and 
businesses. The latter interactions are found to be mostly symbolic and so fail to qualify as 
successful or substantive. Importantly from the perspective of the current paper, stakeholder 
interactions are characterised by inequalities of power and resources (Newell, 2005).  
 
In the third paragraph of the introduction we introduce the Zambian copper mining sector, a 
critical case given the country’s high dependence on the industry economically. Importantly, 
the existing literature on Zambia reviewed in section 2.2, has a limited focus and does not 
provide insights on stakeholder interactions.  
 
Moreover, CSR disclosures in Zambia are limited and driven by MNCs attempts to build 
their public image. More importantly from our perspective however, CSR outcomes are also 
limited and so largely irrelevant to local communities’ needs. Given all of this, a major 
contribution of the paper lies in its focus on the local processes and dynamic interactions of 
the multiple actors that drive, enhance or restrict CSR outcomes in one developing country. 
 
In summary for the purposes of clarity, the paper’s contributions are set out in paragraph 4 of 
the Introduction as follows: 
 
‘Our first major contribution, therefore, lies in our focus on CSR in the Zambian mining 
sector with its complex political economy terrain composed of multiple actors, such as 
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political elites, underdeveloped civil society and powerful mining companies all seeking to 
pursue their interests through strategic interactions. However, rather than focusing on the 
interaction between individual actors (such as, NGOs-business and state-business 
interactions) or placing the companies at the centre of analysis, the multiple stakeholders are 
seen as being interrelated and as constituting part of a dynamic web of complex local 
relationships. The different stakeholders have competing interests, varying degrees of 
salience (Mitchell et al., 1997; Neville and Menguc, 2006; Neville et al., 2011) and 
collaboration potential with other groups (Covey and Brown, 2001; Hamann et al., 2005). 
With regard to our second contribution, , we critically engage with the role of the state as an 
important stakeholder in enhancing CSR, something that has received limited attention in 
CSR studies in developing countries (Idemudia, 2011; Jamali and Karam, 2016). A third 
major contribution is that we  refine Mitchell et al.'s (1997) stakeholder salience framework 
which has been criticised as being static and short-term in orientation (Baba and Raufflet, 
2017) by situating stakeholder interactions within a complex system of irregular, non-linear 
and path dependent (Hamann et al, 2005) actions taking place over time, with consequences 
for the evolution of stakeholder power. As a fourth contribution, is that within these 
stakeholder groups, we find a lack of homogeneity as there are competing voices within each 
group, so  affecting CSR outcomes.. This lack of homogeneity is particularly marked within 
the mining companies as a stakeholder group which includes Chinese State-Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs). Finally, our fifth contribution which is highly significant given the stark 
power asymmetries existing between the state and the corporates, lies in the subtlety added to 
understanding the state-business nexus (Siddiqui and Uddin, 2016) and the potential of 
‘surrogate accountability’ to hold powerful stakeholders into account, so strengthening the 
position of less powerful stakeholders (Belal et al., 2015; Rubenstein, 2007).’ 
 
Comment 2: 
The theoretical framing of the paper is also not well developed. For example, we critique 
stakeholder and legitimacy theories and then say, this is what our paper is about. A discussion 
of stakeholder salient theory is then provided. A discussion of these theories and a clear 
placement of the study within a coherent chosen framework is needed. 
 
Comment 3: 
The framework seems to be an extension of both stakeholder and legitimacy theories, but its 
attempt to mobilise notions of power, for example, needs to be critically examined. What 
notion of power are the authors looking at, i.e., how is power conceptualized? Foucault, 
Marx? How is power to be studied? Issues of accountability also arise. How is accountability 
to be understood and studied? Transparency? Points 2 and 3 are in my view the area of 
greatest concern. 
 
 
Response 2 and 3 (we have chosen to respond to these two comments together as they 
are interlinked): 
 
We greatly appreciate the editor’s comments in this regard and have revised the analytical 
framework section (2.1.) so as to make it clearer and more coherent with the study situated 
better within this framework. 
 
Stakeholder theories and legitimacy theories are widely used in CSR research in both 
developed and developing country contexts. Whilst the current study acknowledges the 
theoretical value of these approaches and explores the interactions of stakeholders, which are 
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partially influenced by their attempts to gain legitimacy, we argue that by themselves, these 
approaches do not capture the complexity of stakeholders’ interaction in the particular 
Zambian context.  
 
Instead of a narrow stakeholder theory approach which places companies in the centre of 
analysis and which focuses on the way companies use CSR to manage their relationship with 
other stakeholders and establish congruence between companies’ values system and that of 
key stakeholders (as in legitimacy theory approaches), the study explores the role of 
stakeholders embedded in a complex web of relationships.  Importantly however, apart from 
companies in particular seeking legitimacy, stakeholder interactions more generally are 
permeated by power asymmetries.  
 
Given these considerations, a broad stakeholder salience framework together with elements 
from a ‘critical collaboration’ approach, such as the concept of path dependence, enable us to 
explain better the dynamics of stakeholder interaction. Both approaches integrate notions of 
legitimacy and power. Stakeholder salience theory (Mitchell et al, 1997) draws on Etzioni’s 
(1964) concept of power such that  
 
“…a party to a relationship has power, to the extent it has or can gain access to 
coercive, utilitarian, or normative means, to impose its will in the relationship. […] 
this access […] is a variable, not a steady state, which is one reason why power is 
transitory: it can be acquired as well as lost” (Mitchell et al., 1997, p. 865-866). 
 
Stakeholder salience is defined as the accumulation of three characteristics: power, 
legitimacy and urgency, while prerequisites for stakeholder collaboration involve the 
balancing of power asymmetries and the legitimacy of the leadership of the different 
stakeholder groups. Our analytical framework focuses on the role of power which has been 
insufficiently explored in previous studies on CSR in developing countries (Lauwo et al, 
2016). 
 
In order to clarify further the framework, the assumptions shaping analysis of the interview 
evidence are set out in ‘Figure 2: Stakeholder interaction in the copper mining sector in 
Zambia’ (please see Response 4). 
 
We agree with your comment that issues of accountability and transparency also arise 
although these do not constitute the key focus areas of our paper. With regard to 
accountability, our analytical framework and in particular critical collaboration theory 
recognises as a prerequisite of stakeholder collaboration (Haman et l., 2005 Covey and 
Brown, 2001) that the ‘leadership of the different stakeholder groups is seen to be legitimate 
and accountable.’ Indeed, much of the paper is concerned with attempts by the various non-
corporate stakeholder groups to hold the mining companies to account. These attempts 
include discussion of the potential of civil society to exercise surrogate accountability by 
making powerful stakeholders accountable for their actions. 
 
Such attempts include drives for greater transparency on the part of the companies. The paper 
includes a major example of such drives, the creation of the Zambia Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative (ZEITI), albeit that its creation came about at the behest of the World 
Bank, and that it operates at an industry as opposed to a firm level. ZEITI is discussed in 
sections 4.2. and 5.2., where according to one participant, the organisation’s potential to 
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promote real transparency is hampered by the rigging in the choice of civil society 
representatives, the one stakeholder group with the potential to push for real change. 
 
Finally, in our section 6. Discussion and conclusions section, we suggest areas for further 
research including: ‘Considering the importance of transparency and stakeholder 
accountability in the context of developing countries, further research could study in more 
detail the different aspects of accountability of the mining companies in particular vis-á-vis 
other marginalised stakeholders (Jamali and Karam, 2016).’ 
 
Comment 4: 
Related to this issue is the question of methodology: how does this theoretical framework 
inform the data collection and analysis of the same? How was coding done, how were the 
themes identified? There is a statement about relying on interviewee interpretations, but this 
gesture to phenomenology is undeveloped. How does the empirical section relate to the 
theoretical framework? Or research questions? This requires some clarification. 
 
Response 4: 
Following the editor’s comments, we have revised section 3. Research approach in order to 
add more information about collection of the data and its analysis.  
  
Our analytical framework focuses on the interaction of key stakeholders in the CSR arena in 
the Zambia mining sector. Given this focus, the empirical material is based on semi-
structured interviews with individuals representing the key stakeholder groups (mining 
companies, various relevant state authorities and ministries, a wide range of NGOs, trade 
unions and local chiefs representing local communities) together with other stakeholders, 
such as a supranational financial institution and a number of higher education institutions. 
 
Coding: 
The interview transcripts were first read by the authors, notes taken and ideas/extracts 
relevant to the analytical framework and aims of the study highlighted. Subsequently, these 
ideas and recurrent themes were discussed and a general coding scheme developed. The key 
themes identified included importantly, the salience of the various stakeholders in their 
interactions with other stakeholder groups and the specific nature of the power asymmetries.  
 
Structure of analysis: 
Discussion of the findings revolved around the interactions of multiple stakeholders (e.g. 
interaction of mining companies with other stakeholders, interaction of the state with other 
stakeholders etc.). Interpretation of the empirical evidence was guided by the analytical 
framework which focused on issues such as stakeholders’ desire for legitimation, the varying 
degrees of stakeholder salience and power asymmetries over time, as well as potential 
conflicts within stakeholder groups and their respective capacity constraints. 
 
Finally, as regards the statement about relying on interviewee interpretations, this has now 
been deleted as not being of primary relevance to the paper, given that this limitation is 
inherent in much research based on participant interviews. 
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